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Mikell Washington  
American University Washington College of Law  
 
Alternative Methods to Regulating Paid Uncredentialed Tax-Return Preparers Post Loving 
 
I. Introduction  
 
With an increasing number of inconveniences with filing taxes and constant changes to the 
already complex Internal Revenue Code, many taxpayers rely on paid tax-return preparers to 
assist in filing their taxes.1 In 2018, the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter “IRS”) conducted 
a study that found approximately 83 million taxpayers paid to have their federal tax return 
prepared for the 2017 tax year.2 The majority of these returns were filed by preparers who were 
neither licensed nor regulated.3 This statistic is concerning because many taxpayers blindly rely 
upon the assistance of paid preparers, despite preparers not being federally regulated, nor 
 
1 Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 2014), aff’d 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 80 (D.D.C. 
2013). 
2 Internal Revenue Service, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/choosing-a-paid-tax-return-preparer 
(last visited Nov. 25, 2019). 
3 Nina E. Olson, More Than a ‘Mere’ Preparer: Loving and Return Preparation, 139 Tax Notes 




required to demonstrate a certain level of competency in federal tax law. 4 John Koskinen the 
IRS Commissioner in 2015, stated “about sixty percent of all tax-return preparers operate 
without any type of oversight or education requirement.”5 As a result of the lack of oversight, tax 
preparers incorrectly file returns which have devastating consequences for taxpayers, taxpayers 
fall subject to fraud and other predatory practices, and the IRS is unable to collect the full 
amount of taxes which they are owed.   
Paid preparers are broken into two major categories, uncredentialed and credentialed 
preparers. Uncredentialed preparers make up approximately sixty percent of all preparers and 
lack any professional licensure or certification. Additionally, they are not regulated nor required 
to demonstrate any competency in tax law before charging for services.6 On the other hand, 
credentialed preparers are regulated and do have professional licensures. They include certified 
public accountants, attorneys, enrolled agents, and enrolled retirement plan agents.7 Currently, 
 
4 Elaine Povich, The Scary Truth About Your Independent Tax Preparer, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Feb. 25, 2014, 10:43 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/25/tax-preparations-
_n_4853792.html.  
5 Internal Revenue Service News Release (2014), New IRS Filing Season Program Unveiled for 
Tax Return Preparers: Voluntary Program to Focus on Continuing Education for Unenrolled 
Preparers, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/IR-14-075.pdf. 
6 Taxpayer Advocate Service,  Return Preparer Oversight: The IRS Lacks a Coordinated 
Approach to Its Oversight of Return Preparers and Does Not Analyze the Impact of Penalties 
Imposed on Preparers (2018), https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2018-
ARC/ARC18_Volume1_MSP_07_RETURNPREPARER.pdf. 
7 Rev. Proc. 2014-42, 2014-2 C.B. 192. 
3 
 
there is not a nationwide regulation program for uncredentialed paid tax-return preparers, but 
New York, Oregon, Maryland, and California have implemented state level regulations.8 With so 
many taxpayers relying on the assistance of paid preparers, majority of whom are uncredentialed, 
it is imperative to have government oversight in the form of regulations. Regulations will 
increase compliance within our tax system by ensuring uncredentialed paid tax-return preparers 
are competent and properly claiming legal positions for taxpayers which they are entitled to. 
Furthermore, regulations will assist in protecting taxpayers, especially those who are low-income 
because they “are often the least educated and least financially sophisticated in the United 
States.”9  
The IRS has made several attempts throughout history to regulate uncredentialed paid tax-
return preparers, the most recent being 2011. In efforts to respond to concerns surrounding 
taxpayers “being poorly served due to [tax] preparers’ inadequate education and training,” the 
IRS promulgated regulations which required uncredentialed tax-return preparers to: 1) pass a 
competency test related to Form 1040 and related schedules, 2) pay annual fees, and 3) complete 
continuing education courses.10 These regulations were rejected before issuance in the landmark 
case Loving v. Commissioner. This decision was a major setback for the IRS because it 
permanently enjoined the IRS from enforcing a “registration scheme against tax-return 
 
8 Povich, supra note 4.   
9 Olson, supra note 3, at 769. 
10 Loving, 742 F. 3d at 1014.  
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preparers,” and held that the IRS does not possess the statutory authority to regulate 
uncredentialed tax-return preparers.11  
This paper argues a nationwide regulation program for uncredentialed tax-return preparers is 
needed and the current regulation regime is insufficient. Regulation helps to ensure effective tax 
administration, ensure ethical standards of preparers, and to protect low-income taxpayers from 
incompetent and unscrupulous preparers. This paper reviews historical attempts by the IRS to 
regulate uncredentialed tax-return preparers and proposes two viable alternatives to regulation 
which will achieve some of the same goals. It provides insight into the landmark case Loving v. 
Commissioner which set precedent for regulating uncredentialed tax-return preparers. And it 
examines current literature both for and against regulating uncredentialed tax-return preparers.  
Part II, A begins by providing background information of how the IRS exercised their 
regulation authority pre- Loving. Part II, B will discuss the promulgated regulations set forth by 
the IRS in 2011, which were rejected in Loving. Part II, C lay outs the current regulatory scheme 
of uncredentialed tax-return preparers post- Loving. Part III, examines recent literature in favor 
and against regulation of uncredentialed tax-return preparers. Part IV, offers a proposal in 
accordance with recent literature, asking for a legislative fix by Congress to provide the IRS the 
authority to regulate uncredentialed tax-return preparers. Additionally, it offers unique 
alternatives to regulation, that achieve some of the same goals as regulation, if a legislative fix by 
Congress is not adopted.  
 
II. Background  
 
11 Id. at 1022.  
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A) 1884 - 2011 
Originally enacted in 1884, 31 U.S.C. §330 provides the Treasury Secretary with the 
authority to “regulate the practice of representatives of persons before the Treasury 
Department.”12 Since the IRS is a bureau of the Treasury Department, 31 U.S.C. §330 includes 
practice before the IRS.13 The regulations set forth by the Treasury Secretary are reprinted under 
the name Treasury Department Circular 230 (hereinafter “Circular 230”).14 Circular 230 was 
created in 1921 and “govern[s] the recognition of attorneys, certified public accountants, enrolled 
agents . . . . and other persons representing taxpayers before the Internal Revenue Service.“15 It 
provides the standards of compliance for tax-return preparers who “practice before the IRS” and 
offers methods and procedures of discipline for those who fail to comply with those standards.16  
Before the IRS promulgated regulations in 2011, the IRS never maintained the position that 
31 U.S.C. §330 or Circular 230 gave them the authority to regulate tax-return preparers.17 
 
12 31 U.S.C. §330 (2020).   
13 26 C.F.R. §601.101(a) (2020). 
14 Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 71.  
15 Id. §330.  
16 Pippa Browde, A Consumer Protection Rationale for Regulation of Tax Return Preparers, 101 
Marq. L. Rev. 527, 552 (2017).  
17 Loving, 742 F. 3d 1013, 1021. (holding, in the first 125 years after the statute's enactment, the 
Executive Branch never interpreted the statute to authorize regulation of tax-return preparers. 




Rather, they maintained the position that 31 U.S.C. §330 gave them the authority to regulate 
credentialed paid tax-return preparers such as attorneys, accountants, and other tax professionals 
“appearing in adversarial proceedings before them through competency standards.”18  
B) 2011 - 2014  
In 2011, the IRS in response to public concerns of the tax preparation industry, promulgated 
regulations which attempted to expand its regulatory authority to uncredentialed tax-return 
preparers.19 The regulations required uncredentialed tax-return preparers to register as a new 
category of preparers called Registered Tax-Return Preparers (RTRP).20 The primary goal of the 
RTRP program was to “increase the quality of the tax preparation industry and to improve 
services to taxpayers.”21 Furthermore, the program was believed to “increase tax compliance and 
help to ensure that tax-return preparers are knowledgeable, skilled, and ethical.”22 The 
regulations required tax-return preparers to: 1) pass a competency test related to Form 1040 and 
related schedules, 2) pay annual fees, and 3) complete continuing education courses.23 In the 
 
18 Id. at 1015.  
19 Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 76 Fed. Reg. 32, 286-87 
(Jun. 3, 2011) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10).  
20 Elaine Smith, Regulating Tax Preparers: Transforming Loving from a Stumbling Block to A 
Stepping Stone, 83 UMKC L. Rev 1079, 1090 (2015). 
21 Internal Revenue Service Registered Tax Return Preparer Test Explained (2012), 
http://irs.gov/pub/irs-news/fs-11-12.pdf. 
22 T.D. 9501, 2010-46, I.R.B. 652. 
23 Loving, 742 F. 3d 1013, 1014.  
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promulgation of the regulations, the IRS relied on 31 U.S.C. §330,24 which provides the IRS the 
authority to “regulate the practice of representatives of persons before the Department of the 
Treasury."25 The IRS estimated the promulgated regulations would apply to approximately 
600,000 to 700,000 tax-return preparers.26  
Three independent tax-return preparers who would be subject to the regulations, brought suit 
against the IRS “seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of the new 
regulations.”27 The individuals argued the regulations were beyond the scope of authority given 
to the IRS by 31 U.S.C. §330.28 The District Court for the District of Columbia held in favor of 
plaintiffs and the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals opined that the IRS’s 
interpretation of the statute was “unreasonable in light of the statute's text, history, structure, and 
context.”29 This case established that the IRS does not possess the authority to regulate 
uncredentialed tax-return preparers because merely preparing a tax-return does not constitute 
practice before the IRS.  
C)  2014 - Present  
 
24 Id.  
25 Id. § 330(a)(1).  
26 Loving, 742 F. 3d 1013, 1014. 
27 Id. at 1016.  
28 Id. at 1014. 
29 Id.  
8 
 
Despite the D.C. Court of Appeals decision to reject the proposed regulations in Loving, 
some regulations still exist. However, the category of RTRP does not.30 The most important 
remaining regulation is the Preparer Tax Identification Number (“PTIN”). The PTIN, which 
derives its statutory authority from Section 6109 (a)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code, began in 
1999 as an “alternative for tax-return preparers furnishing their social security numbers on tax 
returns which they prepared.”31 The PTIN was required to help protect the identity of tax-return 
preparers and to “help maintain the confidentiality of SSNs.”32 The PTIN is a number assigned 
to any individual who for compensation “prepares all, or substantially all, of any federal tax 
return or refund claim.”33 It serves as a mechanism by which the IRS can regulate tax-return 
preparers by collecting data and easily identifying any preparer misconduct.34 Furthermore, it 
allows the IRS to better identify tax-return preparers, centralize information, and effectively 
administer the rules relating to tax-return preparers.35  
The requirements attached to obtaining a PTIN, renewing a PTIN, and failure of having a 
PTIN are so de minimis that the need of greater regulations on tax-return preparers is apparent. 
 
30 Rev. Proc. 2014-42, 2014-2 C.B. 192. 
31 Steele v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 3d 73, 77 (D.D.C. 2016).  
32 Furnishing Identifying Number of Tax Return Preparer, 75 Fed. Reg. 60, 309 (Sept. 30, 2010). 
33 Internal Revenue Service, https://www.irs.gov/tax-professionals/ptin-requirements-for-tax-
return-preparers (last visited Apr. 30, 2020).  
34 Internal Revenue Service, Return Preparer Review Pub. No. 4832, Return Preparer Review 
(2009), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4832.pdf.  
35 See Furnishing Identifying Number of Tax Return Preparer, 75 Fed. Reg. 60, 309 (Sept. 30, 
2010). See also; Montrois v. United States, 916 F. 3d 1056, 1059 (D.C. Cir 2019).  
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To obtain a PTIN, a return preparer can do so by filling an application online called the W-12.36 
There are no prerequisites or filing requirements and the process to complete the W-12 is not 
extensive. So much so, that the IRS boasts that the application “only takes about 15 minutes.”37 
Similarly, the renewal process is just as simple. To renew a PTIN, a preparer must pay a nominal 
fee of $63 and complete another W-12, which takes the same amount of time. The need of 
greater regulations attached to the PTIN is reinforced with the inconsequential fee of $50, a 
preparer must pay per return for failure to furnish a PTIN.38 Therefore, any paid tax-return 
preparer can easily obtain a PTIN and renew a PTIN, without any legitimate risk associated.   
Another form of regulation is the Annual Filing Season Program, an IRS program which 
provides paid tax-return preparers who voluntarily enroll into the program continuing education 
of tax law. Created in 2015, the program serves as an interim measure to regulate tax-return 
preparers by providing them with current updates of federal tax law.39 Furthermore, the program 
is designed as an incentive for tax-return preparers to voluntarily join. To complete the program, 
an uncredentialed tax-return preparer must compete 18 hours of continuing education, which 
consists of a six-hour federal tax law refresher course with a test, ten hours of other federal law 
topics, and two hours of ethics.40 The preparer must also renew their PTIN and “consent to 
 
36 Internal Revenue Service, supra note 35.   
37 Id.  
38 26 U.S.C.S. § 6695 (2020).  
39 Internal Revenue Service, https://www.irs.gov/tax-professionals/annual-filing-season-program 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2020). 
40 Id.   
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adhere to the obligations in Circular 230, Subpart B and section 10.51.”41 After the preparer has 
completed the program, they are awarded a record of completion from the IRS and will have 
their name recognized in a public database of return preparers called the Record of Completion 
Directory on the IRS website.42 Additionally, the preparer is given limited representation rights 
before Revenue Agents, Taxpayer Advocate Service, customer service representatives, and the 
IRS for the returns which they prepared.43  
The Annual Filing Season Program is a strong attempt by the IRS to regulate uncredentialed 
tax-return preparers and provide taxpayers with assurance that their tax-return preparer’s 
competency. However, it is insufficient because the comprehension test’s structure allows 
preparers to “game the system.” If a preparer fails the test on their first attempt, the provider 
administering the test can provide the preparer with the exact test for their second attempt.44 
Similarly, on a preparer’s third attempt, the test provider can administer a test with as much as 
half of the same questions as the second test.45 The current structure of the test does not ensure 
tax preparers are competent in tax law and dampens the IRS’s ability to regulate tax-return 
preparers and ensure a certain level of competency. A preparer who fails the test on their first 
attempt can simply memorize the answers for their second attempt. Similarly, a preparer who 
 
41 Id.  
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Internal Revenue Service, https://www.irs.gov/tax-professionals/ce-provider-faqs-annual-
federal-tax-refresher-aftr-course#act (last visited Mar. 24, 2020). 
45 Id. (explaining, a minimum of fifty percent of the test questions for the third attempt must be 
different than the questions in the prior test). 
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fails on their second attempt, can memorize the answers for their third attempt where they may 
come across as much as fifty percent of the same questions. This practice takes away from the 
IRS’s ability to ensure preparer possess a certain level of competency because preparers can 
study the test and not learn the material.   
The awareness of the Annual Filing Season Program needs to be increased. There are no 
statistics or empirical evidence at the moment that provides insight into the number of taxpayers 
who utilize the RPO Directory when making their selection to hire a preparer. However, it is my 
assumption that many taxpayers do not use the directory because they are unaware of it. If 
taxpayers were aware of the directory, they would utilize it to make informed decisions while 
selecting a tax-return preparer because they would be aware of the amount of tax law knowledge 
the preparer possesses. This informed decision will assist in decreasing levels of concern 
regarding tax-return preparers incompetency and improve confidence of the tax preparation 
industry.  
III. Review of Existing Proposals    
A large portion of current literature concerning regulation of the tax preparation industry 
calls for government regulation over uncredentialed tax-return preparers. This regulation is 
usually in the form of an amendment to 31 U.S.C. §330, which will grant the IRS the ability to 
regulate uncredentialed paid tax-return preparers.46 However, some have made the argument that 
 
46 See Soled and Thomas, Regulating Tax Return Preparation, 58 B.C. L. Rev. 151, 193 (2017).; 
See also; (Alex H. Levy, Believing In Life After Loving: IRS Regulation of Tax Preparers, 17 
Fla. Tax Rev. 437, 467 (2015)).  
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regulation of uncredentialed tax-return preparers would do more harm than good.47 This section 
reviews current literature and discusses existing proposals.   
A. Levy  
In 2014, the year Loving was decided in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, Alex 
Levy wrote an article examining Loving and discussing its aftermath. The article painted a 
picture of the Government’s previous attempts to regulate uncredentialed tax-return preparers. 
Levy, at the time a recent graduate of New York University School of Law, agrees with other 
commentators discussed below that mandatory regulations of uncredentialed tax-return preparers 
is beneficial, and that a legislative fix by Congress may be necessary to achieve it. In fact, Levy 
contends that a legislative fix by Congress is the only pathway left for regulation to be achieved 
because of the Solicitor General failed to petition the Supreme Court after Loving.48  
Levy contends government oversight is needed to assist in properly allocating public 
monies, to decrease incompetence, and to protect low-income taxpayers against fraud and 
predatory practices from uncredentialed tax-return preparers.49 Levy emphasizes the 
consequences of these practices do apply to all taxpayers, but are particularly devastating for 
low-income taxpayers because they lack the resources to detect fraud by their preparer and are 
left “to reimburse the government, plus interest, and may also be barred from claiming a vital tax 
 
47 Bob Ewing, IRS Tax Preparers: A Successful Challenge to the IRS’s Authority To License Tax 
Preparers, https://ij.org/case/irs-tax-preparers/#backgrounder (last visited Apr. 24, 2020).   
48 Id. at 441.  
49 Levy, supra note 46, at 448-50.  
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benefit in the future.”50 Levy acknowledges a legislative fix will be difficult to achieve due to the 
Loving court’s decision and the current political climate.51 Nonetheless, Levy encourages the 
IRS to no let this dissuade them.52 
In coming to this proposal, Levy recounts the IRS’s six-month public review on the tax-
return preparer industry in 2009, in response to concerns about the industry.53 During this 
review, the IRS solicited comments from individuals, groups, and organizations on how to “1) 
increase taxpayer compliance and 2) ensure uniform and high ethical standards of conduct for tax 
preparers” known as Notice 2009-60.54 Levy bolstered his claim for government oversight by 
revealing that Notice 2009-60 received more than 500 comments, some which rejected the idea 
of testing tax-return preparers. But, most which “favored some level of increased regulation.”55 
As a result of these solicitations, the IRS in 2011 promulgated regulations requiring tax-return 
preparers to 1) pass a competency test, 2) pass a background check, and 3) obtain a PTIN, which 
were struck down in Loving.56  
 
50 Id. at 448.   
51 Id. at 469.  
52 Id. at 441.  
53 Id. 
54 Levy, supra note 46, at 442.  
55 IRS Return Preparer Review, supra  note 34. 
56 Levy, supra note 46, at 443. 
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Levy also emphasizes his dissatisfaction with the Loving case. Levy argues that the IRS 
was outmaneuvered because the IRS’s litigation strategy was “bumbling and ill-considered.” 57 
Sarcastically, he questions whether the IRS actually anticipated their regulations to be 
challenged.58 He argues that the IRS should have been more proactive and rejected the court’s 
characterization of a tax preparer as a mere scrivener because taxpayers rely on unregulated tax-
return preparers due to the complexity of the Internal Revenue Code.59 Furthermore, they rely on 
unregulated tax-return preparers because they are “often low income and vulnerable.”60 As a 
result of the Loving failure, Levy argues a simple one sentence inclusion to 31 U.S.C. §330, that 
explicitly gives the government the authority to regulate tax- return preparers is necessary.61  
Levy proposes to change the language of the statute from “the Secretary of the Treasury 
may—regulate the practice of representatives of persons before the Department of the 
Treasury,”62 to the “Secretary of Treasury may—regulate the practice of representatives of 
persons before the Department of Treasury—including compensated preparers of tax returns, 
documents, and other submissions.”63 Levy highlights that this legislative fix is not foreign, 
having received Congressional support in 2013 when Senator Max Baucus of Montana, included 
 
57 Id. at 440.  
58 Id. at 444.  
59 Id. at 445.  
60 Id. 
61 Levy, supra note 46, at 467. 
62 Id. § 330(a)(1).     
63 Levy, supra note 46, at 468.  
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a clause in his tax reform discussion draft on tax administration which granted the IRS explicit 
authority to regulate tax-return preparers.64  
B. Olson   
In 2013, when Loving was pending appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia, Nina Olson the National Taxpayer Advocate (NTA), wrote a Special 
Report to Tax Notes regarding the need for regulating uncredentialed tax-return preparers. Olson, 
who was appointed by the Secretary of Treasury in 2001, dedicated her professional career to 
serving taxpayers as an advocate. Before serving as the NTA, Olson was the Executive Director 
and founder of the Community Tax Law Project, an organization which provides free tax 
assistance to low-income families.65 Furthermore, Olson testified before the House Ways and 
Means Oversight Subcommittee and the Senate Finance Committee in 1997 and 1998, regarding 
problems facing low-income taxpayers.66  
Olson advocates for the regulation of unenrolled (“uncredentialed”) tax- return 
preparers.67 Olson highlights the preparation industry has become a very lucrative market and 
low-income taxpayers have become easy targets of predatory practices.68 Olson argues  
regulation is needed to protect low-income uneducated taxpayers and ensure preparers are 
accurately preparing returns and upholding ethical standards. Olson recommends that Congress 
 
64 Id. at 458. 
65 The Community Tax Law Project, http://ctlp.org/ (last visited May 2, 2020).  
66 Olson, supra note 3, n.4 at 768. 
67 Id. at 769. 
68 Id.  
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adopts her recommendations set forth in her 2002 NTA report, and require uncredentialed tax-
return preparers to register, be tested, and complete continuing legal education.”69 Olson argues 
continuing education and testing are prophylactic because it ensures preparers possess a 
minimum level of competency and professionalism to minimize future negligence.70 
Furthermore, Olson stresses regulations would benefit taxpayers and increase the level of public 
trust for the tax-preparation industry.71 
Olson maintains this argument, despite the Loving court’s holding that the IRS does not 
possess the authority to regulate tax-return preparers. Olson argues that the IRS does in fact 
possess the authority to regulate tax-return preparers because the court incorrectly characterized 
the roles and responsibilities of a tax preparer.72 Olson describes the uniqueness of tax-return 
preparation, explaining that preparing a return “is not merely a ministerial act.”73 Rather, it 
signifies that a tax-return preparer is “in the business of advising and assisting [their] client . . . . 
on the treatment of her items.”74 Therefore, preparing a tax return is “almost always, presenting a 
case” before the IRS because a tax-return preparer “acts as a representative before the IRS when 
they advise and assist a taxpayer in making their claim to the IRS and Treasury.”75 Olson 
continues her argument to say for the above-reasoning, the District Court’s opinion in Loving 
 
69 Id. at 768.  
70 Id. at  777. 
71 Olson, supra note 3, at 778. 
72 Id. at 769-72. 
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
75 Id. at 767.  
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was incorrect because it was based on a “fundamental misrepresentation [of] what occurs in 21st 
century tax administration.76  
Olson does not explicitly call upon a legislative fix by Congress to provide the IRS with 
the authority to regulate uncredentialed tax-return preparers. Rather, she highlights that Congress 
in 1884 placed regulations on tax-return preparers in response to concerns of the tax return 
industry where are identical to current circumstances. Therefore, Congress’s regulation would be 
“permissible and [a] reasonable approach to solving a serious problem in tax administration.”77  
C. Browde 
In 2017, Pippa Browde an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Montana 
wrote an article discussing regulation for uncredentialed tax-return preparers. Browde calls for 
regulation of the return preparation industry, but offers a new outlook on how the issue of 
regulation ought to be framed. Browde frames the issue of necessity for regulation as a 
“consumer protection” issue. One where low-income taxpayers ought to be considered 
consumers and the need of regulation is to prevent uncredentialed tax-return preparers from 
preparing returns with errors and prevent abusive practices against low-income taxpayers. In 
framing the need of regulations as a “consumer protection” matter, Browde focuses on low-
income taxpayer and fails to address the need of regulation to further compliance with the United 
States’ tax system and decrease the tax gap.78 Furthermore, Browde challenges the concept that 
regulations on tax-return preparers would invite compliance.  
 
76 Olson, supra note 3, at 772. 
77 Id. at 777. 
78 Browde, supra note 16, at 556.  
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Browde explains how the role of a tax-return preparer from the perspective of a low-
income taxpayer creates a strong level of dependency because low-income taxpayers primarily 
rely on paid preparers to assist in the preparation and filing of their tax returns.79 She offers 
multiple rationales for this dependency including, that low-income taxpayers believe they lack 
the ability to prepare their return themselves and believe that “using a paid preparer may increase 
the amount of refund they will receive or accelerate their refund.”80 With the existence of this 
relationship, Browde explains taxpayers trust that their preparers are competent.”81   
Browde continues to discuss the dependency between taxpayers and paid tax-return 
preparers by illustrating how paid tax-return preparers have a “unique role in the tax 
administration system . . . to help low-income taxpayers access social welfare benefits 
administered through the tax system.”82 In this assertion, Browde focuses on the history and the 
importance of the Earned Income Tax Credit (hereinafter “EITC”) to low-income taxpayers. She 
explains that the EITC represents “the nation’s largest anti-poverty program and the private 
industry acts as intermediary to assist taxpayers (low-income) claim their eligibility.”83 Due to 
the financial importance the EITC has on low-income taxpayers, Browde argues that “the 
majority of taxpayers claiming EITC benefits rely on the services of tax return preparers.”84 As a 
 
79 Id. at 533. 
80 Id.   
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 538. 
83 Browde, supra note 16, at 538. 
84 Id. at 539. 
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result, Browde alleges this invites fraud.85 Furthermore, Browde argues this reliance from low-
income taxpayers on paid tax-return preparers creates a high error rate.  
D. Jay Soled and Kathleen Delaney Thomas 
Jay Soled and Kathleen Delaney Thomas, tax professors at prominent U.S. law schools, 
desire Congress’s intervention within the tax-return preparation industry just like Olson, Levy, 
and Browde. They argue Congress should regulate the actions of uncredentialed tax-return 
preparers because they “lack expertise in tax law and target low-income taxpayers.”86 
Furthermore, uncredentialed tax-return preparers, “often charge exorbitant and hidden fees while 
frequently making errors, which, if detected by the IRS, leave[s] the taxpayer responsible for 
repayment of taxes and interest.87 Soled and Thomas emphasizes the importance of regulation to 
protect all taxpayers, especially low-income taxpayers.  
Soled and Thomas begin their proposals by articulating the importance of the tax-
preparation industry and the taxation process within the United States. They argue for the private 
sector, the goal of the tax-preparation industry is to generate profit.88 While, the goal of the IRS 
is to collect money which will be used to reduce poverty and redistribute wealth.89 They 
acknowledge that these two goals are at odds with one another, but the IRS’s goal should prevail. 
 
85 Id. (arguing, tax returns claiming the EITC are perhaps the single biggest source of fraudulent 
refund claims).  
86 Soled and Thomas supra note 46, at 154.    
87 Id. at 154.  
88 Id. 
89 Id.  
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Additionally, they argue by regulating uncredentialed tax-return preparers with competency 
standards, the government can ensure a decrease in the tax gap, promote social welfare 
programs, and minimize tax-return errors.90  
To achieve these goals, Soled and Thomas propose a legislative fix by Congress which 
would extend Circular 230’s regulations to apply to all tax return preparers.91 Soled and Thomas 
argue Congress can easily achieve this goal by merely adding two sentences to 31 U.S.C. §330.92 
Soled and Thomas do not provide the specific language change for the proposed legislative fix. 
However, they do offer that one sentence would declare that practice before the Treasury 
Department includes tax-return preparation and the other sentence would “declare that in the 
process of tax-return preparation, tax return preparers act as taxpayers’ de facto 
representatives.”93 This in effect, “will allow the Treasury Department to require all tax-return 
preparers, credentialed or uncredentialed to 1) pass a competency exam, 2) undertake continuing 
tax education courses, and 3) submit a separate, signed statement acknowledging their 
involvement in the process.”94 Furthermore, it will allow the Treasury Department to sanction 
those tax-return preparers who fail to uphold certain moral decency standards.95 
 
90 Id. at 173.  
91 Soled and Thomas supra note 46, at 185.  
92 Id.     
93 Id.   
94 Id. at 186. 
95 Id. at 154.  
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 Soled and Thomas’s article does not address the current regulation through the PTIN. 
Additionally, as a regulatory alternative the article uniquely proposes that the Treasury 
Department could redesign the Form 1040 in a manner that would potentially help ensure better 
tax compliance.96 However, they do not provide guidance of how this will be accomplished, but 
they do admit that this alternative is not feasible without properly addressing the competency 
standard of tax-return preparers.97   
Soled and Thomas add that an expansion of Circular 230 to encompass all tax return 
preparers, will allow the IRS to secure injunctions against a tax-return preparer’s ability to 
practice more easily, enhance financial liability exposure against a preparer who commits errors, 
and strengthen criminal tax sanctions.”98 Soled and Thomas explain that proposing regulations 
has two perspectives, one of the taxpayer and the other from the tax-return preparer. Soled and 
Thomas argue from the taxpayer’s perspective, there should be a decrease or limit on penalties 
for taxpayers who owe the IRS due to an error made by a tax-return preparer.99 Furthermore, 
they recommend that taxpayers be further involved in the tax-return preparation process by 
mandating all taxpayers to “supply their tax-return preparers with a signed-one-page declaration 
consisting of four parts.100 The parts “affirming: i) the importance of taxpayer honesty; ii) the 
advantages associated with the submission of a correct return, iii) the disadvantages associated 
 
96 Soled and Thomas supra note 46, at 163.  
97 Id.  
98 Id. at 190.    
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 191-92. 
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with the submission of an incorrect return, and iv) gratitude expressed by the government for 
taxpayers fulfilling their civic duties.101  
E. Arguments Against Regulation  
Some literature argues that government oversight in the form of regulations is not necessary 
because regulation only benefits large tax-return preparation companies such as H & R Block 
and Jackson Hewitt.102 The Institute for Justice (hereinafter “Institute”), the organization who 
represented Sabina Loving in the landmark Loving case, has adopted this viewpoint. The 
Institute argues that the powerful industry insiders would be the main beneficiaries of regulating 
uncredentialed tax-return preparers, at the expense of independent preparers, because they 
lobbied for the regulations and it would help them to “limit competition and drive more business 
their way.”103 This argument follows the idea that mandatory regulations would drive small 
business tax-return  preparers who are unable to afford the expenses associated with mandatory 
regulations out of business, and benefit the larger tax-return preparation companies who are able 
to afford the regulation expenses. Additionally, The Institute argues mandatory regulations are 
not sincere,  rather a "power grab” attempt by the Obama IRS.104  
 
101 Soled & Thomas supra note 46, at 191, 92. 
102 Levy, supra note 46, at 463. 
103 See id., see also Examiner Editorial, Institute for Justice lawsuit challenges IRS Power Grab, 
(March 14, 2012, 12:00AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/institute-for-justice-lawsuit-
challenges-irs-power-grab. 
104 Levy, supra note 46, at 462.  
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Another argument against regulation is that even if the IRS was provided with the statutory 
authority to regulate uncredentialed tax-return preparers by Congress, the IRS would be unable 
to effectively do so because they lack sufficient resources and competency.105 The IRS similar to 
other government agencies have a limited budget. The budget varies from year to year and 
results in various cancellations of agency initiatives and even hiring freezes. In the current 
regulation regime, the IRS’s limited budget has resulted in them only being “able to audit a tiny 
percentage of returns each year.”106 Thus, IRS resources are scarce. Mandatory regulations to be 
effective would require an increase of IRS resources which the IRS does not possess. For 
example, for the IRS to achieve the regulations set forth in Loving, they would need an increase 
in budget to hire personnel to review background checks and ensure all preparers have completed 
their continuing education requirements. Therefore, regulation is not necessary because the IRS 
does not have sufficient resources to effectively regulate uncredentialed tax-return preparers.  
IV. Proposal  
In accordance with the above literature, a legislative fix by Congress is needed to regulate 
uncredentialed tax-return preparers. Regulation is needed as a mechanism to ensure compliance 
within the U.S. tax system and efficient tax administration. Furthermore, regulation is needed to 
protect low-income taxpayers from predatory practices of incompetent uncredentialed preparers. 
The proposals set forth within this section echo current literature requesting Congress to make a 
legislative fix which will give the IRS the authority to regulate uncredentialed paid tax-return 
preparers. In addition, this section offers two viable alternatives of regulation which will be 
 
105Taxpayer Advocate Service, supra, note 6.   
106 Soled and Thomas supra note 46, at 175. 
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beneficial if Congress refuses to make a legislative fix. It is important to draw a distinction 
between the terms regulation and alternatives. Regulations are mandatory and will be forced 
upon all tax-return preparers who for compensation prepare tax returns. However, this concept 
was rejected in Loving, therefore, the alternatives that I speak of will be voluntary and will only 
apply to those uncredentialed preparers who choose to opt into the program. 
The preferable proposal to achieve regulation for uncredentialed tax-return preparers is a 
legislative fix by Congress to 31 U.S.C. §330. A legislative fix is simple and can be achieved in a 
sentence or two. The sentence will provide clear language which explicitly grants Congress the 
authority to regulate uncredentialed tax-return preparers. The language can be changed from “the 
Secretary of the Treasury may regulate the practice of representatives of persons before the 
Department of the Treasury” to, the Secretary of Treasury may—regulate the practice of 
representatives of persons before the Department of Treasury “including any individual who is 
compensated for preparing tax returns, documents, and other submissions.” 
1. Possible alternatives outside of the Loving regulations  
Even if an amendment to 31 U.S.C. §330 is rejected by Congress or Congress fails to act, 
viable alternatives to regulation exists that will achieve the same goals. These alternatives are 
cost-effective and will provide incentives to uncredentialed tax-return preparers who chose to opt 
in.  
The Annual Filing Season Program discussed in section II, can serve as an alternative to 
regulating uncredentialed tax-return preparers if the critiques discussed are resolved. The 
program currently is voluntary and provides uncredentialed tax-return preparers who choose to 
opt into the program, public recognition of competency through a directory which they can show 
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their clients. However, many taxpayers are unaware of the program and the program’s testing 
structure needs to be changed. If taxpayers were aware of the program and knew that the 
preparers listed on the directory contained a certain level of competency in federal tax law, 
taxpayers would feel more confident in hiring preparers because they would be able to view their 
credentials. Additionally, if the competency test administered was structured in a way that a 
preparer could not simply memorize the test, both taxpayers and the IRS can be assured that the 
returns prepared by uncredentialed tax-return preparers were accurate and contained minimal 
errors, if any.  
These critiques can be easily remedied to serve as an alternative. To change the structure 
of the comprehension test, the Annual Filing Seasons Program can simply adopt the same testing 
curriculum as volunteer programs, such as VITA or TCE which will be discussed in the next 
section. The new testing curriculum will allow uncredentialed preparers to demonstrate 
competency in tax law and ensure competency depending on the type of tax law they desire to 
pursue. To raise awareness of the program, the IRS can simply advertise the program and its 
benefits on their website, billboards, and other relatively cheap platforms. The benefits received 
by any uncredentialed tax-return preparer who voluntarily opts in the Annual Filing Season 
Program would be that they are provided with clients who need to have their returns prepared but 
are outside the eligibility scope of volunteer programs. Furthermore, they will be provided with 
taxpayers who have contacted the IRS for assistance or whom the IRS have previously issued 
deficiencies, as a result of an incorrectly filed return or a preparer’s error.  
Another viable alternative to regulation is connecting taxpayers with preparers who 
complete the Volunteer Income Tax Assistance Program (VITA), Tax Counseling for the Elderly 
(TCE), or a similar volunteer program with training and a competency test. VITA is a federally 
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funded program by the Treasury Department and provides free tax-return preparation services to 
all individuals including those with disabilities, whose income is $56,000 or less.107 Similarly, 
TCE is a federally funded program and offers “free tax help to individuals sixty or older.”108 For 
both programs, a potential taxpayer who is outside the scope of eligibility is declined assistance 
and left to locate a tax-return preparer who is able to file their return. I propose that these turned-
away taxpayers are provided with the names of the tax-return preparers who have successfully 
completed the program. Furthermore, these taxpayers names should be placed on a list which any 
tax preparer who has successfully completed the program could access and contact the taxpayer.  
To become a VITA volunteer, identical to become a TCE volunteer, an individual must 
complete a series of in-person course trainings on federal tax law and pass a competency test. 
The test varies in difficulty depending on the level of preparation an individual desires (i.e. basic, 
advanced, military, health savings, international, foreign student and scholars)109 and the 
individual must receive a minimum score of eighty percent to pass.110 After completion of the 
trainings and the competency test, the individual is certified as a preparer and permitted to 
prepare returns. They are assumed to possess sufficient knowledge to accurately prepare tax-
returns based upon the level of which they pursued.  
 
107 Internal Revenue Service, https://www.irs.gov/individuals/free-tax-return-preparation-for-
you-by-volunteers (last visited Apr. 26, 2020).  
108 Id.   
109 Id.  
110 Id.  
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The alternatives will achieve some of the same goals that regulation would, but without 
mandating that all uncredentialed tax-return preparers opt into the program. Additionally, the 
alternatives will benefit individual or small business uncredentialed tax-return preparers. Small 
shop tax preparers (“mom and pop shops”) who opt into these programs would not fear losing 
money or being beat out of competition by the bigger tax preparation industries as a result of 
opting into these programs. In fact, they may be able to compete with the larger corporate 
preparation competition because they would receive referrals of clients who are outside of the 
eligibility scope of the VITA program and would have their name published in the Record of 
Completion Directory. These incentives will serve as a sufficient incentive for uncredentialed 
tax-return preparers to pay the expenses associated with the alternative program. 
V. Conclusion  
Uncredentialed tax-return preparers are the majority of tax-return preparers and are not 
required to demonstrate any level of competency in tax law nor any knowledge at all. They are 
simply required to fill out a form online and obtain a PTIN which takes merely a few minutes. 
But, if they make a mistake on a taxpayer’s return, those consequences to the taxpayer can be 
devastating. This seems highly inequitable. Additionally, volunteers in programs such as VITA 
or TCE are required to take trainings on tax law and competency tests, but paid preparers are not. 
It seems illogical to have trainings for volunteer preparers, but not paid preparers.  
The Internal Revenue Code is complex and changes periodically which causes taxpayers to 
blindly rely upon paid tax-return preparers. Taxpayers assume their hired preparer is competent 
and will prepare their return honestly and without errors. But, this is not always the case and 
there is not a sufficient regulation regime that currently exists to enforce this. Statutory penalties 
are insufficient to induce fear and to prevent preparers from committing fraud and other 
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predatory practices. Therefore oversight is needed. It can be in the form of a simple legislative 
fix within 31 U.S.C. §330 by Congress. But, if Congress fails to act or rejects such a fix, 
alternatives in the form of the Annual Filing Season Program or the VITA/TCE program is 
viable. These programs will meet the two major goals of the RTRP program which was to 
“increase the quality of the tax preparation industry and to improve services to taxpayers.”111 
Uncredentialed tax-return preparers who are now competent in tax law will increase the quality 
of the tax preparation industry by preparing tax-returns with less errors which will help the IRS 
with their collection efforts. Additionally, competence will assist uncredentialed tax-return 
preparers in demonstrating to both their referred and non-referred clients that they contain a 
sufficient amount of knowledge which will improve services to taxpayers.  
 
 
111 Internal Revenue Service, Registered Tax Return Preparer Test Explained (2011), 
http://irs.gov/pub/irs-news/fs-11-12.pdf.   
